Cyber@UC Meeting 77

Magical Goats

If You're New!

- Join our Slack: cyberatuc.slack.com
- Check out our website: cyberatuc.org
- **SIGN IN!** (Slackbot will post the link in #general every Wed@6:30)
- Feel free to get involved with one of our committees: *Content Finance Public Affairs Outreach Recruitment Lab*
- Ongoing work in our research lab!



Announcements

- Battelle Visit Nov. 20th from Aaron McCanty!
- Lab committee volunteers!
- Merchandise on the way, Online Shop
- Cyclones game social event Nov 17th!
- CTF team training Nov 17th 11am-6pm



Weekly News

StatCounter Hijacked Leads To Bitcoin Theft

- Gate.io crypto exchange compromised by their web analytics service, StatCounter
- Malicious code found on >700k websites, bundled with traffic tracking code
- Replaced tracking script with code target Gate.io customers
- StatCounter is a bit old, but very popular real-time web analytics platform
 - Reported as being used in >2 million websites and >10 billion page views/month
- Malicious code made to target a gate.io specific URI
- Code replaced destination of bitcoin address with that of attacker's
 - Generated a new address everytime
- Gate.io no longer uses StatCounter
- Gate.io has not released stats on how many were affected

VirtualBox Flaw, Escaping The Sandbox

- Vulnerability for Intel PRO 1000 MT Desktop network card when network mode is set to NAT, memory corruption
- OS type does not matter
- Poc published to GitHub, link in article
- Allows a malicious attacker with root privs in guest OS to escape and run arbitrary code in the application layer (ring 3, low privs) on the host
- Could leave host open to other vulnerabilities, like privilege escalation
- Not yet patched



Bleeding Bit

- Two new zero day vulns found by Armis, the guys who caught BlueBorne
- Allow arbitrary code execution and full C&C w/o auth
 - \circ Ex. Insulin pumps, pacemakers, credit card readers, routers
- Vulns in bluetooth chips made by Texas Instruments
- Sending more traffic to the BLE chip causes a buffer overflow, allow malicious code execution, requires physical proximity
- Firmware update feature, Over the Air firmware Download (OAD)
- All Aruba devices share OAD password, obtainable by sniffing legitimate packets or reverse-engineering the firmware
 - Attacker can send a malicious firmware update
- Patches released last Thursday

Recommended Reading

https://thehackernews.com/2018/11/android-in-app-updates-api.html

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/u-s-secret-service-warns-id-thieves-are-abu sing-uspss-mail-scanning-service/

https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/the-morris-worm-turns-30-/ d/d-id/1333225

https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/05/malware-1980s-brain-virus-morris-w orm/

Recommended Reading (continued)

https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/09/us-air-force-hackable-bug-bounty-pr ogram/

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/bug-bounty-hunter-ran-isp-doxing-service/

https://thehackernews.com/2018/11/gaming-server-ddos-attack.html

https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/08/cyber-insurance-question/

https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/09/emotet-launches-major-new-spam-c_ampaign/

Recommended Reading (continued)

https://thehackernews.com/2018/11/portsmash-intel-vulnerability.html

https://thehackernews.com/2018/11/self-encrypting-ssd-hacking.html

https://thehackernews.com/2018/11/woocommerce-wordpress-hacking.html



OUR FEATURE PRESENTATION

Workshop: Goat Disassembly

"I can't wait to be in this goat" - You, right now.

The Topics Today Go Something Exactly Like This

- Quick touch on Assembly & Disassembly
- The RE tools in Kali and IDA
- Battelle's Feed the Magical Goat CTF



Assembly?!

- Nearest possible human readable version of machine code
- Everything is either stored in registers, which can be compared to variables, or in literals values (ints/strings)
- Functions are called subprocesses
- First years take note

08048918	pushl	%ebp
08048919	movl	%esp,%ebp
0804891b	subl	\$0x4,%esp
0804891e	movl	<pre>\$0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp)</pre>
08048925	cmpl	<pre>\$0x63,0xfffffffc(%ebp)</pre>
08048929	jle	08048930
0804892b	jmp	08048948
0804892d	nop	
0804892e	nop	
0804892f	nop	
08048930	movl	<pre>0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax</pre>
08048933	pushl	%eax
08048934	pushl	\$0x8049418
08048939	call	080487c0 <printf></printf>
0804893e	addl	\$0x8,%esp
08048941	incl	<pre>0xfffffffc(%ebp)</pre>
08048944	jmp	08048925
08048946	nop	
08048947	nop	
08048948	xorl	<pre>%eax,%eax</pre>
0804894a	jmp	0804894c
0804894c	leave	
0804894d	ret	

Registers?!

- Usually prefixed with a "%"
- You only have 8 that you should really be looking at / using
- Basically 32 bit pointers / ints
 - Pointers are ints
- Google the names for x64, there's plenty of tables

08048918 pushl %ebp 08048919 movl %esp,%ebp \$0x4,%esp 0804891b subl 0804891e \$0x0,0xffffffc(%ebp) movl 08048925 \$0x63,0xffffffc(%ebp) cmpl 08048929 jle 08048930 0804892b 08048948 jmp 0804892d nop 0804892e nop 0804892f nop 08048930 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax movl 08048933 pushl %eax 08048934 pushl \$0x8049418 08048939 call 080487c0 <printf> 0804893e addl \$0x8,%esp incl 0xffffffc(%ebp) 08048941 08048944 jmp 08048925 08048946 nop 08048947 nop 08048948 %eax,%eax xorl 0804894a 0804894c jmp 0804894c leave 0804894d ret

Subprocesses

- Equivalent of functions
- Functions arguments are **pushed** 0804892e onto the stack 0804892f
- The subprocess is called .
- Subprocess return as functions do

08048918 pushl %ebp 08048919 movl %esp,%ebp \$0x4,%esp 0804891b subl \$0x0,0xffffffc(%ebp) 0804891e movl \$0x63,0xffffffc(%ebp) 08048925 cmpl 08048929 jle 08048930 0804892b 08048948 jmp 0804892d nop nop 0804892f nop 08048930 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax movl 08048933 pushl %eax 08048934 pushl \$0x8049418 08048939 call 080487c0 <printf> 0804893e addl \$0x8,%esp incl 0xffffffc(%ebp) 08048941 08048944 jmp 08048925 08048946 nop 08048947 nop 08048948 xorl %eax,%eax 0804894a 0804894c jmp 0804894c leave 0804894d ret

Conditionals

- Variables can be **compared**
- **Jumps** in execution can be made depending on comparisons
- Jumps can also be unconditional (like goto & break)
- C if statements are typically compares and jumps sequentially executed

	08048918	pushl	%ebp
	08048919	movl	%esp,%ebp
	0804891b	subl	\$0x4,%esp
	0804891e	movl	<pre>\$0x0,0xffffffc(%ebp)</pre>
	08048925	cmpl	<pre>\$0x63,0xfffffffc(%ebp)</pre>
	08048929	jle	08048930
	0804892b	jmp	08048948
	0804892d	nop	
-	0804892e	nop	
	0804892f	nop	
	08048930	movl	<pre>0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax</pre>
	08048933	pushl	%eax
	08048934	pushl	\$0x8049418
	08048939	call	080487c0 <printf></printf>
	0804893e	addl	\$0x8,%esp
	08048941	incl	<pre>0xfffffffc(%ebp)</pre>
	08048944	jmp	08048925
	08048946	nop	
	08048947	nop	
	08048948	xorl	<pre>%eax,%eax</pre>
	0804894a	jmp	0804894c
	0804894c	leave	
	0804894d	ret	

Other Notes

- Strings are typically stored as static character arrays then copied later when they are used
- This is basically just C with harder syntax and heavy use of goto
- Every instruction has a position offset value compared to where the program's base memory address is

08048918	push
08048919	movl
0804891b	subl
0804891e	movl
08048925	cmpl
08048929	jle
0804892b	jmp
0804892d	nop
0804892e	nop
0804892f	nop
08048930	movl
08048933	push
08048934	push
08048939	call
0804893e	addl
08048941	incl
08048944	jmp
08048946	nop
08048947	nop
08048948	xorl
0804894a	jmp
0804894c	leav
0804894d	ret

shl	%ebp
vl	%esp,%ebp
ıbl	\$0x4,%esp
vl	\$0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
ıpl	<pre>\$0x63,0xfffffffc(%ebp)</pre>
e	08048930
np	08048948
p	
p	
p	
vl	<pre>0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax</pre>
lshl	%eax
ıshl	\$0x8049418
11	080487c0 <printf></printf>
ldl	\$0x8,%esp
lcl	0xfffffffc(%ebp)
ıp	08048925
p	
p	
orl	<pre>%eax,%eax</pre>
ıp	0804894c
ave	
t	

Other Notes Cont.

- AT&T vs Intel Format
- Move operations just copy paste a register value into another ______ register

0804892d nop 0804892e nop 0804892f nop 08048930 movl 0xffffffc(%ebp),%eax 08048930 movl 0xffffffc(%ebp),%eax 08048930 movl 0xffffffc(%ebp),%eax 08048933 pushl %eax 08048934 pushl \$0x8049418 08048939 call 080487c0 <printf> 0804893e addl \$0x8,%esp 08048941 incl 0xfffffffc(%ebp) 08048944 jmp 08048925 08048946 nop 08048947 nop 08048948 xorl %eax,%eax 0804894a 0804894c leave</printf>		08048918 08048919 0804891b 0804891e 08048925 08048929 0804892b	pushl movl subl movl cmpl jle jmp	<pre>%ebp %esp,%ebp \$0x4,%esp \$0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp) \$0x63,0xfffffffc(%ebp) 08048930 08048948</pre>
08048933 pushl %eax 08048934 pushl \$0x8049418 08048939 call 080487c0 <printf> 0804893e addl \$0x8,%esp 08048941 incl 0xfffffffc(%ebp) 08048944 jmp 08048925 08048946 nop 08048947 nop 08048948 xorl %eax,%eax 08048948 jmp 0804894c 0804894a jmp 0804894c leave</printf>	aste	0804892e	nop nop	
		08048933 08048934 08048939 0804893e 08048941 08048944 08048946 08048947 08048948 0804894a	pushl pushl call addl incl jmp nop nop xorl jmp	<pre>%eax \$0x8049418 080487c0 <printf> \$0x8,%esp 0xfffffffc(%ebp) 08048925 %eax,%eax</printf></pre>

Disassembly

- All the 1337 HaX0rs do it
- You should too
- Process of taking apart binary programs, which are typically compiled from C/C++
- Static analysis Just reading assembly code
- **Dynamic analysis** running and debugging the program
- Basically just feed a binary in and assembly code comes out



ComputerHope.com

Disassembly Tools in Kali Linux (and IDA)

Binary Tools (ELF / PE)	Android / Java Tools
diStorm3 IDA edb-debugger OllyDbg Valgrind YARA strings	apktool dex2jar jad javasnoop jd-gui smali



Interactive Disassembler (IDA)

- Download the **free** version from <u>https://www.hex-rays.com/</u>
- Radare2 looks like a good alternative but I'm not familiar with it yet
- Grab the Magical Goat zip file from https://www.battelle.org/cyber-challenge
- I don't have any slides for IDA itself so we'll just go into it with the binary



Aaron McCanty, who helped prepare the goat challenge, will be here next week and will be at CEAS tomorrow